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Figure 1.—Lightning can ignite methane in sealed areas of mines.
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Reducing the Danger of Explosions
in Sealed Areas (Gobs) in Mines 
Objective
To identify techniques to reduce the probability of gob gas
explosions.
Background
In the last 6 years, seven explosions of methane and/or coal dust
occurred within worked-out, sealed areas (gobs) of underground
U.S. coal mines.  These explosions, believed to have been started by
lightning, destroyed many mine seals and caused much damage
external to the sealed area.  Three of these gob gas explosions
occurred in one mine in Alabama over a 3-year period.  Fortunately,
the explosion forces and the toxic gases that vented from the sealed
gob area did not cause fatalities or injuries, but they destroyed
several large seals.  If miners had been inspecting or working near
these areas, the potential for serious injury and/or death would have
been high.  The United Mine Workers of America and the Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) requested that the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) help
identify the mechanisms for lightning penetration into the gob and
recommend ways to reduce the probability of occurrence of future
explosions from such lightning penetrations into sealed areas of
underground coal mines.
Because three of the explosions occurred in a single mine, special
attention was focused on these particular explosions.  The first
occurred in April 1994 in a sealed area, which enclosed about 1.35
square miles of abandoned workings (gob).  This explosion
destroyed 3 of the 38 seals that surrounded the gob.  These seals
were less than 2,000 ft away from three 4.5-in-diam steel-cased test
wells that extended from the surface into the mine entry.  At the time
of the explosion, the National Lightning Detection Network (NLDN)
verified 12 lightning strikes within 10 miles of the mine, including
several above the gob.  After the 1994 explosion, the damaged seals
were rebuilt using an acceptable seal design capable of withstanding
a 20-psi explosion, as required by 30 CFR 75.335.  On January 26,
1996, a second gob explosion destroyed five more cementitious
pumpable seals less than 2,000 ft away from those destroyed in 1994
and even closer to the steel-cased wells.  The NLDN verified
72 lightning strikes in the area of this second gob explosion.
Compressive strength analyses of fragments from the destroyed seals
showed that strengths ranged from 11 to 138 psi, with an average of
83 psi.  This is over 100 psi below the minimum 200-psi compressive
strength requirement for cementitious pumpable seals.  These seals
were again replaced.  On July 9, 1997, the third and most violent
explosion occurred in the same vicinity of the last two explosions.
Three more cementitious pumpable seals were destroyed, including
one newer seal that exceeded the minimum 200-psi compressive
strength requirement.  The NLDN verified 695 lightning strikes above
the mine during the time in which the explosion occurred.  MSHA's
accident investigation report indicated that the maximum pressure
(propagating forces) of this explosion exceeded 20 psi.  The current
seal construction regulations, which relate to all suitable under-
ground seal designs, assume that an explosion occurring in the gob
will not be stronger than 20-psi pressure.  However, if a large
flammable gas volume exists in the gob, the resulting explosion
pressure can be >20 psi.
Approach
Two conditions are necessary for an explosion to occur:  (1) a
fuel-air mixture with a fuel concentration in the flammable
(explosible) range and (2) an effective source of ignition for that
mixture.  If the source of ignition, in this case presumed to be the
lightning, cannot be eliminated, then the only alternative is to
eliminate flammable concentrations or reduce the volume of the
flammable mixture present in the sealed area.  If the gob atmosphere
contains methane concentrations greatly above the upper flammable
limit of 15% methane, it will be unaffected by lightning or by other
potential sources that might exist in the gob.  Other ignition sources
could include the sudden discharge of old batteries, roof falls, and
spontaneous combustion.  After the third explosion in the same gob
area in the Alabama mine, all parties agreed to pressure balance the
sealed gob area in order to reduce the leakage of air into the gob and
therefore to increase the concentration of methane in the gob to well
above the upper flammable limit.  By reducing the average
differential pressure from 3 in to about 0.46 in of water gauge across
the gob, the average volumetric air leakage into the sealed area was
reduced by a factor of 2.5.  This reduction in seal leakage greatly
reduced the probability of formation of a large volume of flammable
methane-air mixture in the gob.
Results
The sealed gob area was pressure balanced in July 1997, and the
methane concentrations in the gob were monitored by MSHA
through February 2000.  The gas samples from behind the seals
indicated methane levels >20%.  This is well above the upper
flammable limit.  During this same period, several severe storms,
accompanied by lightning, passed over the gob area without
apparently triggering a gob explosion.  One storm was so severe that
an imbedded tornado passed over the mine, ripping the doors from
the ventilation fan without disturbing the gob.  To date, it seems that
the combination of constructing suitable seals that met the
requirements of the CFR, coupled with pressure balancing of the
sealed gob, helped reduce gas leakage and minimized the formation
of a flammable methane-air mixture in the gob.
Recommendations
Minimizing pressure differentials across seals should be con-
sidered an essential part of the overall strategy for sealing gobs.
Reducing the pressure differential reduces the air leakage through the
seal and thus reduces the formation of large flammable methane-air
volumes in the gob.  Any wires or metal conductors, including steel-
cased wells, that connect the surface and the gob area should be
removed.  These contribute to the transfer of energy into the mine.  If
possible, nonconductive well casings should be used.  In addition, old
batteries, which are another potential ignition source, should not be
left behind in the gob.  During the sealing process, adequate rock dust
(80% incombustible) should be used both inside and outside of the
sealed areas to reduce the contribution of coal dust to a methane
explosion.
For More Information
For more information on these findings, contact Michael J. Sapko
or Kenneth L. Cashdollar, NIOSH Pittsburgh Research Laboratory,
P.O. Box 18070, Cochrans Mill Rd., Pittsburgh, PA  15236-0070,
phone: (412) 386-6619 or (412) 386-6753, fax: (412) 386-6718,
e-mail: msapko@cdc.gov or kcashdollar@cdc.gov.  In addition,
"MSHA Accident Investigation Report, Non-Injury Explosion, Oak
Grove Mine, July 9, 1997" by Doniece Scott and Clete R. Stephan
describes the various pressure-balancing techniques for all seals and
other safety aspects that need to be addressed when using this
approach.
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